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INDIVIDUAL RATIONALITY, HAZARD WARN-
INGS, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW
W. Kip Viscusi*
1. THE ROLE OF HAZARD WARNINGS
Hazard warnings and other forms of risk information have
become increasingly prominent mechanisms for promoting
safety. Government-mandated warnings on products continue
to proliferate, and private parties have taken advantage of
various warning mechanisms as well.
Warnings have a truly substantive economic purpose and
are not simply mechanisms for satisfying consumers' "right to
know." First, by informing consumers of the risk level associat-
ed with a product or an activity, warnings can better enable
individuals to make the threshold decision of whether to pur-
chase such a product or to engage in such behavior. A consum-
er may wonder about the dangers inherent in driving an all-
terrain vehicle or using paint stripper. Hazard warnings can
assist in providing answers and information regarding the
potential adverse consequences of such products and activities,
thus better enabling the recipient of the information to make a
sound decision. The second function of warnings is to promote
accident avoiding behavior within the context of risky activi-
ties. Warnings alert consumers to the need to wear rubber
gloves while using lye, and they urge workers to avoid the
kinds of sharp turns that could lead to tip over a forklift truck.
These two functions of warnings overlap in some instances. If
warnings lead to a belief that a potentially risky activity is
* George G. Allen Professor of Economics, Department of Economics,
Duke University, and Olin Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard
Law School.
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safe, then they also may affect the threshold decision of wheth-
er to participate in this activity.
Although the discussion of warnings is most concrete for on-
product warnings, such as those on cigarette packages, the role
of such mechanisms is much more diverse. The overall context
of discussion should be sufficiently broad to include not only
on-product warnings, but also other mechanisms for hazard
communication, such as videos, training manuals, and safety
education programs. Because of the perils of scuba diving,
participants in that sport are required to become certified for
open water diving by one of two major international organi-
zations.' This training program includes a detailed discussion
of the risks associated with scuba diving and training in how
to avoid these risks. Although these hazards cannot be con-
veyed through a simple on-product warning, such as a label on
an air tank, this information transfer is still a warning. How-
ever, because the message that must be conveyed is complex,
an on-product warning is not sufficient to alert persons to the
risks inherent in the activity. Consequently, the overall con-
cern should be whether the entire hazard communication sys-
tem, including warnings and other mechanisms of information
transfer, is sufficient to enable the recipient to make sound
risk-averting decisions.
If all people were fully rational and cognizant of all the risks
they faced, then they would always select an efficient level of
safety in all their activities and other choices. Thus people
would trade off the potential benefits of the risky behavior
against the costs, including the risks to life and limb, and
select the activity and product mix that best promoted their
welfare. In such a world, there would not only be no need for
hazard warnings, but there also would be no need for liability
of any kind. Purchasers of hazardous products, for example,
would always value the improved safety associated with safer
variants of products and would provide the correct price incen-
tives for product manufacturers to sell safer products through
their willingness to pay more for products that provide a great-
er desired level of safety at an appropriate cost.
1. The Professional Association of Diving Instructors and the Nation-
al Association of Underwater Instructors provide certification.
[Vol.48:625626
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Matters are not always that ideal, however. One potential
failing is that consumers may not be fully cognizant of the
product risks or with the mechanisms that can be used to
reduce these hazards. First time riders on a three-wheeled all-
terrain vehicle may not be aware of the need to shift one's
body during a turn in order to avoid a tipover and may not
even be aware of the vehicle's underlying instability even
though these issues are discussed in the owner's manual for
the vehicle. Hazard warnings may address these issues, but in
some instances the product is so inherently risky that the
warnings are insufficient to enable people to use the product
safely. The consent decree between the ATV industry and the
Consumer Product Safety Commission, prohibiting the sale of
new three-wheeled ATVs, can be viewed as an implicit recogni-
tion that prohibiting the sale of new three-wheeled ATVs was
preferable to simply manipulating the product warning.2
The purpose of this paper is to formulate how one should
think about such situations. In some instances, it may be de-
sirable to mandate product safety directly, either through gov-
ernment regulation or by imposing tort liability. In other in-
stances, hazard warnings alone may be sufficient. Neverthe-
less, how are we to judge such warnings and, even if we have
an effective warning, how are we to assess whether a warnings
policy alone is adequate or whether additional strictures
should be placed on the product safety level? This paper will
examine the conditions that should be met for effective warn-
ings and whether the utilization of hazard warnings is under-
taken efficiently.
The context for defining the role of a warning will be gov-
erned by the world in which the warnings policy operates. In
particular, similar to technological limitations which affect the
feasible safety characteristics of products, cognitive limits of
the individual's ability to process warnings determine the role
of warnings in influencing behavior. Because people have limit-
ed information processing capabilities, it is not feasible to
provide them with unlimited warning information. Instead,
issues of structure, format, and content become particularly
2. See United States v. American Honda Motor Co., Civ. No. 87-3525
(D.D.C. filed Dec. 30, 1987).
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salient in one's consideration of warnings. A principal concern
is how these cognitive limitations should affect the criteria
that should be applied in judging warnings. More generally, to
what extent should these limitations influence overall liability
doctrines, including the reliance on warnings, as opposed to
requirements that influence product safety characteristics
directly.
The principal theme of this discussion is that while cognitive
limitations may be important and define the context in which
warnings are perceived, they do not radically alter how we
should think about liability tests or the role of warnings. Indi-
vidual behavior in averting risks still remains an important
component of promoting product safety. To the extent that
warnings can effectively provide information that leads to
efficient levels of precautions, it would be socially undesirable
to foreclose the opportunity to exploit this additional safety-
enhancing mechanism. Unfortunately, the tort liability system
does not function in a manner that is ideal from the standpoint
of the incentives that are created. Tort law currently is asym-
metric in terms of its structure. Firms may potentially incur
tort liability penalties for underwarning. Yet there are no pen-
alties levied for overwarning. The uncertainty of whether
warnings meet the liability test consequently provides incen-
tives for firms to overwarn, thus potentially diluting the effica-
cy of warning in other contexts as well. This paper will assess
the degree to which people can process hazard warning infor-
mation and how cognitive limits affect the criteria for hazard
warnings policy. Government warnings have begun to play an
increasing role in society. The government has standardized
food nutrition labels,3 and Congress has mandated the exact
wording of warnings for cigarettes4 and alcoholic beverages.5
3. 21 C.F.R. § 104.5 (1995).
4. The government mandates that cigarette packages must have one
of the following labels:
Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart
Disease, Emphysema, and May Complicate Pregnancy.
Surgeon General's Warning: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Re-
duces Serious Risks to Your Health.
Surgeon General's Warning: Smoking by Pregnant Women May
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.
628 [Vol.48:625
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Numerous regulatory agencies monitor to varying degrees
hazard warnings for jobs, prescription drugs, pesticides, chemi-
cals, and medical devices.' The increased prominence of warn-
ings is not an accident. Rather, it reflects a recognition that
information can play an important role in promoting safety
and, in particular, in taking advantage of the role that poten-
tially injured parties have in limiting the frequency and extent
of accidents. Hazard warnings also are attractive because they
are an intermediate policy option between no form of regula-
tion and more restrictive measures, such as those that would
either ban the product or greatly alter its characteristics.7 The
flexibility of warnings enables those who are unwilling to incur
risks to take appropriate precautions or to avoid the risky
activity, and also enables individuals who are willing to engage
in risky behavior to do so.
A final advantage of warnings is that they promote behavior
on a decentralized basis. In many job contexts, the employer
can monitor worker actions and the degree to which workers
are being careless in carrying out the job operations. But for
many consumer products and in some employment contexts as
Surgeon General's Warning: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon
Monoxide.
15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(1) (1994).
5. Any alcoholic beverage must have the following stated on its label:
"Government Warning: (1) According to the Surgeon General, women
should not drink alcoholic beverages during pregnancy because of the risk
of birth defects. (2) Consumption of alcoholic beverages impairs your
ability to drive a car or operate machinery, and may cause health prob-
lems." 27 U.S.C. § 215 (1994).
6. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration monitors haz-
ard warnings for employees. 29 C.F.R. § 1910 (1995). The Food and Drug
Administration mandates labeling provisions for both prescription drugs,
21 C.F.R. § 201 (1995), and medical devices, 21 C.F.R. § 801 (1995).
Warnings on labels of pesticides are prescribed by the Environmental
Protection Agency. 40 C.F.R. § 156 (1995).
7. See generally W. KIP VIsCUSI & WESLEY A. MAGAT, LEARNING
ABOUT RISK: CONSUMER AND WORKER RESPONSES TO HAZARD INFORMA-
TION (1987) [hereinafter VIscusI & MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK] (ana-
lyzing the precautionary behavior of individuals using caustic household
cleaners); WESLEY A. MAGAT & W. KP ViscUSi, INFORMATIONAL AP-
PROACHES TO REGULATION (1992) [hereinafter MAGAT & VISCUSI, INFOR-
MATIONAL APPROACHES] (discussing the intermediate role of warnings).
1996] 629
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well, the risky decisions are being made on a decentralized
basis where it is impossible to monitor whether precautions
are being taken. A drain opener manufacturer does not know
whether a consumer will in fact wear rubber gloves while us-
ing the drain opener, but the warning message can alert the
consumer to the need for taking precautions in hopes that this
information will lead people to take the appropriate level of
care.
The detailed review of the strengths and limitations of warn-
ings that will follow suggests that there are in fact limitations
to effective warnings that courts should take into account.
Nevertheless, hazard warnings have played and can continue
to play a constructive role in fostering safety-related behavior.
These limitations, however, will inevitably affect the criteria
courts should apply to hazard warnings and the way in which
liability tests should be structured for hazard warnings as well
as decisions that directly affect the safety characteristics of
products.
2. THE COGNITIVE CONTEXT
If individuals had perfect information processing capabili-
ties, then the task of information transfer would be much easi-
er than it is in practice. For example, there would be no need
to have patient package inserts for prescription drugs. Phar-
maceutical firms could simply refer interested patients to the
pertinent scientific literature and let them form their own
judgments. Currently, companies do not do this, in part be-
cause the cost of providing information is greatly reduced if the
information is distilled and provided in conjunction with the
product. Moreover, since most people lack a sophisticated sci-
entific background or the time and ability to delve into the
nuances of the medical literature, firms summarize the key
substantive implications pertaining to the product and how it
affects the consumer's decision to buy the product or to decide
how it should be used.
In the extreme view, human cognitive limitations might
appear to be so significant that it would be irrational to rely on
hazard warnings at all. Individuals have limited information
processing capabilities and make potentially flawed decisions.
To overcome these inherent human weaknesses, we can take
630 [Vol.48:625
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steps to regulate the technological risk characteristics of prod-
ucts, rather than delegate responsibility for safety to individu-
als who have imperfect decisionmaking abilities.8
Professor Howard Latin provides a useful reference point for
considering the potential shortcomings of hazard warnings as
well as considering the inventory of consumer failings with re-
spect to warnings.' Professor Latin argues that the cognitive
limitations that impede the effectiveness of warnings provide a
rationale for tort liability guidelines with more direct influence
over product safety. ' ° Although his focus is on hazard warn-
ings, the behavioral phenomena he discusses have wider appli-
cations beyond this specific context and are based on findings
pertaining to behavior.
Before reviewing the range of possible cognitive failures that
can take place, it is important to stress that the existence of
shortcomings in cognitive processes does not imply that warn-
ings are completely ineffective. Rather, we must identify which
failures are important in a particular warning context and, if
the failures are consequential, determine how much they im-
pede the efficacy of the warnings. Specifically, to what extent
will decisions diverge from what people would choose to do if
they were rational decision makers who possessed sound infor-
mation processing capabilities?
We should also examine the prevalence of the cognitive limi-
tation at issue, that is, look at the limitation's overall effects
on groups as well as individuals. How significant is a given
shortcoming for the entire class of people making the particu-
8. The probability that a given situation will deteriorate is aptly
summarized by Murphy's Law: "If anything can go wrong, it will." In his
commentary on hazard warnings, Howard Latin suggests that individual
behavior is so flawed that responsibility should be delegated to firms who
would be required to alter the underlying safety characteristics of prod-
ucts. He describes this as "true strict liability." Howard Latin, 'Good'
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1193, 1292-94 (1994). What I call Howard Latin's Law, which is a vari-
ant of Murphy's Law, might aptly be summarized as: "Everything goes
wrong." The view that I will adopt here is that matters are not quite so
bleak, but that the role of cognitive limitations does require an adapta-
tion on the part of the courts in their liability criteria.
9. Id. at 1206-57.
10. Id. at 1281-94.
1996]
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lar warnings decision? In the case of product liability, firms
are generally producing products for a mass consumer market.
There may, of course, be segments of the market that will not
process the information accurately, but if the great preponder-
ance of consumers can effectively comprehend the warning,
then the aggregate social welfare loss may not be a vital con-
cern.
In addition, we should also ascertain whether the person
experiencing cognitive failure is significant in terms of being
the target audience for the warnings. Suppose, for example,
that we are dealing with a prescription drug for which the
learned intermediary, the physician, is the primary recipient of
the warning and will choose the drug that will be prescribed
for the patient. It is more important to determine whether the
physician will be affected by information processing difficulties
than whether the consumer who is not the actual recipient of
the information will be able to reliably process the information
on the patient package insert.
The first kind of cognitive limitation results from a failure to
read warnings at all. Clearly, if warnings are not read, they
will not be processed and will have no influence in promoting
safety precautions. Due to multiple demands on their time and
attention, certain people may simply choose not to read the
hazard warnings on a household chemical product or the in-
struction manual for a lawnmower.
This failure to read warnings is not mere conjecture. Studies
of the degree to which consumers read nutrition labeling on
food packaging suggest that only one-fourth of all consumers
can recall the sodium content listing on food labels and only
40% recall having read the ingredient listing at all." A com-
parable study of consumer reading of patient package inserts
found that only 69-74% of patients who are given prescription
drugs with accompanying leaflets claim to have read the leaf-
lets."2 Another piece of evidence corroborating that some con-
11. These results are based on a study by JAMES T. HEIMBACH, THE
PUBLIC RESPONDS To LABELING OF THE SODIUM CONTENT OF FOODS
(1983).
12. DAVID E. KANOUSE ET AL., INFORMING PATIENTS ABOUT DRUGS:
SUMMARY REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE DESIGNS FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG
LEAFLETS 15-16 (RAND Corp. Report R-2800-FDA 1981).
632 [Vol.48:625
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sumers fail to read warnings is that as of July 1970, 73% of
Utah residents drank alcohol, but only 35% recall reading the
alcoholic beverage warning.'
3
A consumer's functional illiteracy or incompetence may also
contribute to his or her failure to effectively process a warning,
as would a consumer's loss or destruction of the directions for
the product.'4 Information overload may also prove to be an
impediment to effective processing of warnings because con-
sumers may be inundated with so many pieces of information
that they cannot process all the warning messages they re-
ceive. Finally, consumers may neglect to process the warnings
because they are relying on other factors, such as learned in-
termediaries or their own general knowledge.'5
A useful appropriate reference point for thinking about
warnings is whether the information contained in the warning
ultimately will have any economic impact. As a general rule,
information provided in a warning that does not achieve the
effect of altering an individual's behavior has no value to the
individual targeted by the warning.'6 This rule excludes con-
sideration of factors such as anxiety or fear which may, of
course, be alleviated by the information provided. For the most
part, the purpose of warnings is to foster sound consumer
decisions about choosing potentially risky activity or taking
precautions when pursuing that activity. If the warning infor-
mation would not alter these decisions, then there will be no
effect on the risk or benefits of these choices or on consumer
welfare more generally.
A second class of cognitive failures results when the warn-
ings are read but not understood. The warning may include
excessive detail that is difficult for consumers to process or to
13. See Debra L. Scammon et al., Alcohol Warnings: How Do You
Know When You've Had Too Many, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y MKTG. 214 (1990).
14. See Professor Latin's discussion for documentation of these and
other related phenomena. Latin, supra note 8, at 1207-20.
15. This reliance may not necessarily be misplaced if, for example, the
learned intermediary will process the information more effectively and
transmit it in a manner that will better enable the consumer to make a
sound decision.
16. See HOWARD RAIFFA, DECISION ANALYSIS: INTRODUCTORY LECTURES
ON CHOICE UNDER UNCERTAINTY (1968).
19961 633
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assess precisely the probabilities associated with the potential
consequences of a product's use. Thus the implications of a
consumer's intended actions may be uncertain (for example, a
consumer may not be able to determine accurately what the
risk is that a severe skin burn will result from failure to wear
rubber gloves while using lye). This cognitive limitation may
be due in part to the fact that consumers have inadequate ex-
pertise regarding this particular class of risks. Another difficul-
ty may result when the level of risk varies due to a heteroge-
neous population of consumers. Diabetics, for example, may
face greater risks from consuming alcoholic beverages and
smoking than non-diabetics. Also, the way in which the risk
issue is framed by the warning may have important implica-
tions for how that information is processed. For instance, if I
were to inform you of the risk of driving without a seat belt in
terms of the risk per car trip, the risk per mile, or the annual
risk of such behavior, you might reach very different conclu-
sions about the magnitude of the risk depending on which
particular frame of reference I utilized in my warning. 7
Even if individuals receive and understand warnings, they
may nevertheless fail to follow them for a variety of reasons.
Consumers may forget the warnings, they may have excessive
confidence in their own ability to avoid the risk, or they simply
may not believe the warnings. A consumer's failure to heed a
warning, even when read and understood, highlights the diffi-
culty of determining what is in fact a "good" warning. A good
warning is one that enables consumers to form accurate risk
judgments and provides information that is sufficiently salient
so that consumers will undertake the desired behavior. If a
warning fails to convey information in a credible manner, the
resulting shortcoming should be judged a failure of the warn-
ing itself rather than of warnings policies more generally.
Note that it may also be the case that a consumer fails to
follow a warning and nevertheless makes a sound decision.
17. Professor Latin also alludes to other forms of failures in decision
making, such as the representativeness heuristic, the availability heuris-
tic, and cognitive dissonance. Latin, supra note 8, at 1229-35. Neverthe-
less, these are shortcomings of decisions more generally and are not
problems that have been specifically documented with respect to the role
of hazard warnings.
[Vol.48:625634
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Warnings are advisory in nature, not mandatory. Consider the
case of wearing rubber gloves while using household chemical
products. Wearing gloves surely is desirable from the stand-
point of promoting safety. On the other hand, wearing gloves
may seem bothersome and unappealing to people who do not
generally wear gloves while performing household chores.
Depending on the extent of the risk and the degree of discom-
fort associated with wearing gloves, people could rationally
decide not to wear gloves while undertaking such activities.
Indeed, this example has been documented explicitly
through empirical evidence demonstrating the degree of
disutility that the typical consumer experiences with respect to
wearing rubber gloves."8 If low severity and frequency of inju-
ry is associated with not wearing rubber gloves, it would be
quite reasonable for people to choose not to wear rubber gloves
in such contexts. A premise underlying many warnings policies
is that an element of individual discretion should be present in
decisions about whether to follow warnings because of the
heterogeneity of risks and the heterogeneity of costs associated
with precaution taking. Thus the failure of certain consumers
to obey a warning should not necessarily be viewed as a failure
of the warnings policy but may instead be a result of the open-
ended nature of decision making that is possible even in a
world with fully effective warnings.
The presence of individual discretion over decision making is
not only a complicating factor in warnings contexts, but also is
encountered when the issue of choice is considered more gener-
ally. Most of the evidence specifically documenting these vari-
ous cognitive failures tends to involve choices made under risk
and uncertainty and not choices made in warnings contexts per
se. These studies often do not document the extent to which
individuals' decisions diverge from optimal behavior. What
remains to be assessed is how significant various cognitive
limitations are in any particular warnings context, and the
extent to which the limitations impede sound decision making.Finally, it is vital to keep in perspective that warnings deci-
sions is just one category in the vast realm of decisions made
18. See VIscUIsi & MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 7, at
68-70.
1996] 635
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in life. How do the potential problems arising from cognitive
limitations in warnings situations compare with the problems
that result from any other decision that may be affected by
similar deficiencies in choice? Are warnings decisions really so
momentous when viewed in a broader context? Literature
regarding the effectiveness of warnings often refers to situa-
tions involving products such as BB guns and lawnmowers."
The courts may be properly concerned with our ability to pro-
cess information with respect to these areas of choice. Realisti-
cally, though, how do the consequences of mistaken decisions
about such products compare with the potential losses that
may result when we make truly fundamental choices through-
out the course of our lives, such as the choice of our career,
school, religion, or spouse? Almost invariably, these other non-
product risk decisions may lead to much greater social losses
than those associated with erroneous choice in a hazard warn-
ings context. These are also decisions made under uncertainty.
Yet there is little activity on the part of the courts to impose
sanctions that would reduce these failures. Nor has there been
any government regulation to try to control these choices in
the absence of tort liability.
3. THE POTENTIAL RATIONALITY OF INDiVIDUAL DECISIONS
The foundation of economic analysis of choice is based on the
rationality of individual decision making. As a consequence of
consistent and rational choices, economists have established a
number of relationships. For example, consumers generally
buy less of the product as the price goes up. Workers are more
willing to supply their labor at higher wage rates." For any
given level of riskiness, stockholders prefer higher profit en-
terprises.
Nevertheless, even in the context of risks, people make ratio-
nal decisions based on a variety of components. Individual
19. These examples are used in the discussion by Professor Latin,
supra note 8, at 1260-61, 1265-68, 1271-73 and are not uncommon in
other assessments as well.
20. There are, of course, problems of backward bending labor supply
curves whereby paying workers too much money makes leisure relatively
more attractive.
[Vol.48:625636
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tradeoffs between risk and other attributes are, for example,
reflected in risk-money tradeoff valuations. Workers require
additional pay to accept jobs that pose greater risk. On aver-
age, for each additional occupational fatality, workers are com-
pensated on the order of $3-7 million." Thus, at the midpoint
estimate of the value of life of around $5 million, the average
worker receives an additional wage premium of $500 per year
to face an additional annual death risk of 1/10,000. For a group
of 10,000 similarly situated workers who receive $500 per year
more in compensation, the total additional annual compensa-
tion will be $5 million for each one statistical death. Hence,
economists generally refer to the implicit value of life in this
instance as being $5 million. What should be emphasized,
however, is that the issue of concern is not the value of a cer-
tain death but rather the value of a low probability of death.
The premiums that workers receive for nonfatal risks also
follow an expected pattern that bolsters the character of this
evidence." Consider, for example, the differences in the risk
premium commanded by different segments of the population
who differ in their attitudes toward a given risk. One would
expect individuals who are more willing to bear risk to incur
job hazards for a low value per unit risk, and those who are
less willing to bear risk to require a higher amount of wage
compensation per unit risk. This pattern is in fact borne out in
terms of the preferences of different groups that take various
safety precautions. For example, nonsmoking seat belt users
have the highest value of injuries; their implicit value of an on
the job injury is $83,200. Next in terms of unwillingness to
incur job injuries and demands for additional compensation are
people who take only one of the two precautions relating to
seat belt use and cigarette smoking. Smoking non-seat belt
users receive the lowest wage premiums for job risks, receiving
an average of $26,100 for each statistical job injury. Thus the
way in which workers sort themselves among jobs and the
compensation they require to bear risks is very much in line
21. See W. Kip ViSCuSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RE-
SPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992) [hereinafter Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS].
22. See Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking, Seatbelt
Use, and Differences in Wage-Risk Trade-Offs, 25 J. OF HuM. RESOURCES
202 (1990).
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with what one would expect based on a rational economic
choice.
The nature of the life at risk is also not homogeneous. Older
workers have less to lose in terms of the quantity of life than
do younger workers. The evidence also suggests that this quan-
tity of life is reflected in the wage premiums workers re-
ceive.'
This kind of evidence is not restricted to the labor market.
Product markets respond in a similar fashion to individual
attitudes toward risk. Economists have documented a variety
of money-risk tradeoffs reflected in individual choices of smoke
detectors, seat belt use, and property value responses to air
pollution risks.24
Similarly, the evidence for used cars and consumer purchas-
es of these cars bolsters the implications of the labor market
evidence. Whereas workers on jobs encounter these risks on a
continuing basis and would be expected to acquire information
over time about these risks through their job experience, car
purchasers would tend to have less refined knowledge of the
risk across different automobile makes, at least to the extent
that this information is gained through direct experience. Nev-
ertheless, there is strong statistical evidence indicating that
safer used cars do in fact command a higher price.' Indeed,
these consumer decisions, as reflected in the choice of the car,
indicate that car purchasers have about a $3 million value of
life.28 Thus a car that posed an additional fatality risk of
1/100,000 would command a premium of $30 in the used car
market.
An interesting aspect of the car purchase decision is that
consumers are buying a durable product. Safer cars will pro-
vide for greater safety throughout the life of the product, not
23. See W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rates of Time Preference
and Valuations of Duration of Life, 38 J. PUB. ECON. 297 (1989).
24. For a review of these studies, see Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS,
supra note 21, at 223-45.
25. Such evidence is controlled for a variety of other car attributes,
such as size and fuel efficiency.
26. See Mark Dreyfus & W. Kip Viscusi, Rates of Time Preference and
Consumer Valuations of Automobile Safety and Fuel Efficiency, 38 J.L. &
ECON. 297 (1995).
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simply in the initial year. Are consumers myopic in thinking
about these safety properties? Estimates of consumer interest
reflected in car buyers' valuation of the long-term safety as-
pects of cars suggests that these rates are in fact in a reason-
able range. One can certainly reject on a statistical basis the
possibility that consumer decisions completely ignore the fu-
ture consequences of their automobile purchases.
27
4. PATTERNS OF RISK PERCEPTION ERRORS
The usual assumption underlying much of tort liability is
that consumers of risky products systematically underassess
the risks. As a result, additional tort liability or strict liability
for the product injury is required to provide manufacturers
with the appropriate incentive to produce safe products.
There are, of course, situations in which consumers do in
fact underestimate the risk. Some hazards may be hidden, and
they may involve risk consequences that are not well publi-
cized. It is doubtful, for example, whether asbestos workers in
the shipyards during World War II understood the full extent
of the risks posed by their asbestos exposures.
This situation of risk underestimation is not necessarily the
norm. Indeed, there are many important classes of risks for
which there is a tendency to overestimate the risk rather than
to underestimate it. Figure 128 presents the pattern of risk
perception for a wide class of risks of mortality. The horizontal
axis presents the actual number of deaths per year from these
various causes, and the vertical axis is the perceived number of
deaths. If risk perceptions equal the actual risk level, all obser-
vations would fall on the 45 degree line. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that there is a systematic bias in the nature of risk per-
ceptions. Low probability risks, such as those from botulism
and tornadoes, tend to be overestimated. In contrast, very
large risks, such as our lifetime risk of being killed from heart
disease or cancer, tend to be underestimated. This pattern is
quite systematic in that it relates to the magnitude of the risk.
To the extent that people overestimate low probability events,
27. See id.
28. See W. KIP VIScUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND
ANTITRUST 662 (1992).
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it is likely that product risks that also tend to be low probabili-
ties may also be overestimated because of the bias associated
with misperceptions based on risk magnitude. 9 Of course,
this result assumes that individuals are cognizant of the class
of risks associated with the product and that this risk is not a
hidden hazard that they do not even know exists.






10 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
Statistical estimate of deaths per year
The second attribute of a risk that strongly affects how indi-
viduals react to it concerns the degree of ambiguity. One of the
more famous biases in economics is associated with the
Ellsberg Paradox."0 The Paradox hypothesizes that individu-
als have a chance of winning a prize by drawing a ball from
29. For a formal rationale for this systematic bias with respect to the
magnitude of the risk, see Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 21, at
102-10.
30. D. Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J.
ECON. 643 (1961).
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one of two urns. Suppose that urn one has a fifty-fifty mix of
red and white balls and you win a prize by drawing a red ball.
In contrast, urn two has 100 balls that are red and white, but
you are uncertain of the exact mixture. Prior to drawing a ball,
you can choose which color ball would result in the awarding of
a prize from urn two. If you had a choice between the two
urns, which urn would you select to give you a chance of win-
ning a prize? The great preponderance of subjects prefer urn
one which offers the precise probability of success even though
urn two is probabilistically equivalent in terms of the mean
probability of success. For example, you can guarantee yourself
a "hard" 0.5 probability of success with urn two by selecting a
color based on the flip of a coin.
In addition to being averse to ambiguous chances of success,
there is also evidence that people are averse to ambiguous
chances of incurring a loss. Table 1" summarizes an experi-
ment in which individuals confronted differing risks per mil-
lion residents of nerve disease from air pollution exposures."
In the first panel, individuals received risk information from
two experts, one of whom believed the risk was 150 per million
and the other who believed the risk was 200 per million. The
mean risk that respondents viewed as equivalent to this risk
range was 178 per million, which is just above the midpoint of
the risk range of 175 per million. If the extent of ambiguity is
increased, as in panel 2, there is much greater aversion to the
uncertainty involved. When one expert believes the risk is 110
and the other assesses it at 240, the average of the risk assess-
ments remains at 175. Respondents view the mean risk that is
equivalent to this risk range as being equivalent to 191, how-
ever. In the case of losses, consequently, we have the counter-
part of the Ellsberg Paradox: people will be unwilling to incur
ambiguous risks of suffering losses. Put somewhat differently,
the worst case scenario will tend to loom disproportionately
large in their judgments about the magnitude of the risk.
31. See Viscusi, FATAL TRADEOFFS, supra note 21, at 144.
32. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Communication of Ambiguous Risk In-
formation, 31 THEORY & DECISION 159 (1991).
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TABLE ONE: RISK AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND THE
SIZE OF THE NERVE DISEASE RISK SPREAD
STANDARD
RISK LEVELS SAMPLE ERROR OF MINIMUM MAXIMUM
IN AREA A SIZE MEDIAN MEAN MEAN (#) (#)
Panel 1: Risk
Ambiguity 65 175.00 178.35 1.24 150.50 200.00
150,200 (1) (1)
Panel 2: Size
of Spread 58 180.00 191.08 3.95 115.00 240.00
Effect (1) (13)
110,240
This result suggests that for product risk choices, individuals
may not always feel confident in their knowledge of the level of
the risk. This, however, does not necessarily imply that the
risk will be ignored. Indeed, to the extent that their knowledge
is imprecise as a result of conflicting risk information, the
overall tendency documented in the literature is that they will
tend to be excessively averse to the risk. People will display
ambiguity aversion, thus avoiding situations in which they
cannot precisely quantify a hazard. Perhaps for that reason,
consumers often react with alarm to publicized risks such as
newly discovered carcinogens, or to other threats, such as
breast implants, for which there is substantial scientific debate
but no firm resolution of the extent of the risks that may in
fact be present.
Another facet of the risks that is consequential in influenc-
ing individual behavior is whether information regarding the
risk has indicated a change in the risk level. In particular, con-
sumers tend to overreact to increases in risk as opposed to risk
decreases. The existence of this phenomenon as well as the
role of potential overestimation of risk is reflected in the fol-
lowing example of consumer valuations of improved safety of
household chemicals.' Table 2"' summarizes consumers' re-
sponses to differing changes in the risk for two products.
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TABLE Two: MARGINAL VALUATIONS OF
REDUCING BOTH RISKS BY 5/10,000
INCREMENTAL WILLINGNESS TO PAY (DOLLARSBOTTLE)
STARTING RISK INHALATION- INHALATION- GASSING-
(INJURIES1 SKIN CHILD GASSING- CHILD
10,000 BOTTLES) POISONING POISONING EYEBURN POISONING
15 1.04 1.84 .65 .99
10 .34 .54 .19 .24
5 2.41 5.71 .83 .99
The first column indicates the starting risk of injury per
10,000 bottles of a product, which begins at 15/10,000. Each of
the columns indicates consumers willingness to pay in terms of
additional price per bottle for reducing the risk by 5/10,000 for
the amount shown in the first column. Thus the first entry in
the second column of the table indicates the valuation consum-
ers place on reducing the risks of inhalation and skin poison-
ing from insecticide by 5/10,000, which they believe is worth
$1.04 per bottle. Parents with children were asked how valu-
able it would be to reduce the risk of inhalation and child poi-
soning by 5/10,000. These parents believed reducing the risk
would be worth $1.84. The final two columns of Table 2 pertain
to risks associated with toilet bowl cleaner, which have an ini-
tial value of $0.65 for reducing the risks of gassing and eye
burn by 5/10,000 and a value of $0.99 for reducing the risks of
gassing and child poisoning by this amount. The next row in
the table gives the incremental value for the next successive
reduction of the risk. Once the risk level has been reduced to
10/10,000, the issue becomes how much would consumers be
willing to pay for an additional risk reduction. This amount is
less than one would expect since people should have a dimin-
ishing willingness to pay for improvements in product safety.
The final row of the table is quite striking in that it indicates
the amount that people would pay to completely eliminate the
risk once it has reached a level of 5/10,000. That risk decre-
ment has a value that jumps to the highest value observed in
each of the columns. Consumers are much more willing to pay
for a risk decrease that completely eliminates the risk even
though the magnitude of the risk reduction is no greater than
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is achieved in the previous rows of the table.
This anomaly affects two underlying phenomena. First, to
the extent that low probability risks are overestimated, indi-
viduals may in fact perceive the risk reduction of 5/10,000 to
zero as being greater in magnitude than a risk reduction from
10/10,000 to 5/10,000 even though statistically they are the
same. Second, a risk reduction to zero eliminates the need to
worry about the risk at all, thus alleviating risk concerns by
more than might be simply captured with a reference to the
shift in probability involved.
The results in Table 2 indicate how consumers would re-
spond to successive reductions in the risk of injury from these
household chemical products by 5/10,000. What if this question
were turned around so that instead of purchasing decreases in
risk, consumers were faced with a prospect of a risk increase
for which they were offered a price discount? How would the
discounts required compare with the amounts that consumers
were willing to pay for a risk decrease? For infinitesimally
small changes in risk, the amounts per unit of risk reduction
should be identical.
The results in Table 1 indicate how the same sample of
consumers responded to a risk increase of 1/10,000, which was
one-fifth of the size of the risk decrease that was the subject of
their responses in Table 2. In pretesting of the survey, consum-
ers were given the option of responding to a risk increase of
5/10,000, which is the same amount used for the risk decrease
questions. Yet the consumer response was so negative that it
threatened the viability of the survey. The results in Table 3'
indicate that even with a fairly modest increase in risk, con-
sumers were highly reluctant to purchase products that had
increased in risk at any price. Depending on the injury pair
involved, from 62% to 77% of respondents believed that the
product was too risky to purchase even if a price discount were
offered, and, if that was not sufficient, they would be paid to
use the product. Moreover, for the very small segment of con-
sumers who were willing to name a finite price cut that they
found acceptable, the magnitude of this price reduction was
35. See MAGAT & ViSCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES, supra note 7,
at 63.
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considerable. In the case of inhalation-skin poisoning, the
mean price reduction per bottle required for consumers to be
indifferent to a risk increase of 1/10,000 was $2.86, where their
starting risk value was 15/10,000. In contrast, this consumer
group was only willing to pay $1.04 for a risk decrease of
5/10,000 from the same starting value. The risk reduction per
unit risk that was required was more than an order of magni-
tude greater than the willingness to pay per unit risk for a risk
decrease.
TABLE THREE: RESPONSES TO RISK INCREASE
(+1,+1) VALUATION QUESTIONS
36
PERCENTAGE FOR MEAN VALUE
WHOM PRODUCT IS ($IBOTTLE) OF
INJURY PAIR TOO RISKY TO POSITIVE
PURCHASE RESPONSES
Inhalation-Skin Poisoning 77.2 2.86
Inhalation-Child Poisoning 68.1 3.19
Eyeburns-Gassing 61.5 5.52
Gassing-Child Poisoning 74.3 1.28
This asymmetry suggests that consumers are quite reluctant
to depart from their current risk reference point. Other re-
searchers have subsequently designated this phenomenon a
status quo bias in which people are quite reluctant to depart
from their accustomed risk level.3 7
This phenomenon has particularly important implications
for how consumers view product risks and, in particular, how
they view new risks that are called to their attention either
through hazard warnings, public information dissemination, or
some other means. Perceived risk increases are likely to be
36. This question asked subjects what price discount they would re-
quire on the new product to accept an additional risk of 1/10,000 for
both injuries, starting with risks of 15 injuries per 10,000 bottles sold for
both injuries.
37. William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in
Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988).
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viewed with alarm, resulting in a significant danger of overre-
action to warnings with respect to new risks that consumers
did not view as an accustomed characteristic of the product.
Another systematic characteristic of risk perceptions is that
highly publicized risks tend to be overestimated.38 Natural
disasters such as tornadoes and floods tend to receive substan-
tial publicity, which accounts in part for their high risk percep-
tion that was shown in Figure 1. Similarly, there has been
substantial risk information disseminated with respect to ciga-
rettes both in the media and through hazard warnings, the net
effect of which is that consumers may overestimate the risk.
TABLE FOUR: SMOKING FATALITY RISK PERCEPTIONS39
MEAN (STANDARD ERROR OF THE MEAN)
SAMPLE LUNG CANCER TOTAL SMOKING
FATALITY RISK MORTALITY RISK
Full Sample .38 .54
(.02) (.07)
Current Smokers .31 .47
(.04) (.05)






Consider the data that are summarized in Table 4.4o This
information pertains to the smoking fatality risk perceptions of
smokers based on a regional sample. Results for a national
sample pertaining to lung cancer risk perceptions yield even
38. See BARUCH FISCHHOFF ET AL., ACCEPTABLE RISK (1981) (offering a
critical analysis of risk determination).
39. Sample size = 206.
40. See W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING: MAKING THE RISKY DECISION 77
(1992) [hereinafter VISCUSI, SMOKING].
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starker results as the population perceives the lung cancer
incidence rate among smokers to be 0.42, whereas estimates
based on the scientific literature would put that risk from
three to seven times smaller.41 As the data in Table 4 indi-
cate, the majority of people view the lung cancer fatality risk of
smoking to be 0.38 and the total smoking mortality risk to be
0.54. As one would expect, smokers view their prospects more
favorably; they consider their lung cancer fatality risk to be
0.34 and the total smoking mortality risk to be 0.47.
TABLE FivE: ACTUAL SMOKING RISK
RANGES IN 1985 AND 1991
SURVEY LUNG CANCER TOTAL TOTAL
YEAR MORTALITY RISK MORTALITY MORTALITY
TO SMOKER RISK TO RISK TO
SMOKER SOCIETY
1985 .05 -.10 .16 -. 32 .21-.42
1991 .06 -. 13 .18-.36 .23-.46
If we compare these risk perception amounts to scientific
evidence pertaining to the true estimated risk level shown in
Table 5,42 then the pattern of overperception of the risks is
clearcut. As of 1991, the survey year that gave rise to the data
in Table 4, the estimated lung cancer mortality risk to smokers
was 0.06-0.13. Therefore, even the upper bound of this possible
risk range lies considerably below risk estimates. Similarly,
the total mortality risk to smokers is also overestimated,
though to a lesser extent than is the lung cancer mortality
risk, which is the risk component that has received the greater
publicity.43 The final column in Table 5 indicates the total
mortality risks to society, including the risks of environmental
tobacco smoke, genetic damage, and fires. Even the upper
41. For a report of these results, see id. at 70.
42. See id.
43. For example, the risks of lung cancer were featured in the inau-
gural governmental information effort against smoking. U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, SMOKING & HEALTH: REPORT OF THE ADVI-
SORY COMM. TO THE SURGEON GEN. OF THE PUB. HEALTH SERV. (1964).
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bound of this risk range, which includes risks beyond those to
smokers themselves, is a bit below the total smoking mortality
risk perception of both the entire population as well as current
smokers.
Hazard warnings also may create excessive perception of
small risks. This danger is particularly great in situations in
which the warning language utilized is adapted from an exist-
ing warning for risk that is relatively great. A notable example
of this was California's Proposition 65, which imposed hazard
warning labels on food products that contained potential car-
cinogens or reproductive toxicants. The proposed wording of
the warning under California Proposition 65 was as follows:
"WARNING: The state of California has determined that this
product is dangerous to your health." 4 Thus, this warning is
a variant of the 1969 cigarette warning that was in place
through the early 1980s.
TABLE SIX: COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA
WARNING WITH OTHER WORDINGS
FRACTION WHO FRACTION WHO FRACTION WHO
REGARD REGARD REGARD
OTHER OTHER OTHER
HAZARD WARNING AS LESS AS MORE AS EQUALLY
RISKY RISKY RISKY
Use of this product may
be hazardous to your
health. This product
contains a chemical .56 .26 .18
that has been deter-
mined to cause cancer
in laboratory animals.
Warning: The state of
Illinois has deter-
mined that this prod- .36 .16 .48
uct is dangerous to
your health.
Caution: Use of this
product may be haz- .14 .17 .69
ardous to your health.
44. For further discussion, see W. Kip Viscusi, Predicting the Effect of
Food Cancer Risk Warnings on Consumers, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J.
283 (1988).
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Table 6" summarizes the responses of the group of 99
adult consumers to various risk comparisons. The reference
point was the suggested wording under California Proposition
65, with the only change being that the "state of California"
was replaced by the "state of Illinois" to better match the
subjects' resident state. As a result, the reference point warn-
ing was the following: 'WARNING: This product contains a
chemical known to the state of Illinois to cause cancer." Re-
spondents were then asked to compare this warning with three
other warnings to assess which warning implied a greater risk.
The first warning listed in Table 6 is the wording used for the
saccharin warning for consumer products containing saccharin.
The 1 in 100,000 lifetime fatality risk threshold for Proposition
65 warnings is approximately 40 times as small as the esti-
mated lifetime risk posed by saccharin."" Even though the
saccharin risk is in fact greater than the risk threshold for
Proposition 65, 56% of the respondents regarded the saccharin
warning as indicating a lower risk, and 18% viewed it as pos-
ing an equal risk. Only 26% of the respondents regarded the
saccharin risk warning as conveying a greater risk level.
The second comparison warning in Table 6 is a variant of
the 1969 cigarette warning, with the main difference being
that the state of Illinois is the source of the warning rather
than the Surgeon General. Approximately half of the respon-
dents viewed this cigarette warning as indicating an equiva-
lent risk to the Proposition 65 warning, and just over one-third
of the respondents viewed the cigarette-based warning as pos-
ing a greater risk.
The final comparison warning in Table 6 is identical to the
1965 cigarette warning. Overall, 69% of the sample viewed this
cigarette warning as indicating an equal risk to the Proposition
65 warning, with the remainder being roughly divided between
the other two categories of riskiness.
These results suggest that by mimicking much of the word-
ing of the cigarette warning, the proposed warning under Cali-
fornia Proposition 65 also indicates a risk that is equivalent in
45. See id. at 307.
46. See Curtis C. Travis et al., Cancer Risk Management: A Review of
132 Federal Regulatory Decisions, 21 ENvTL. SCl. TECH. 415, 417 (1987).
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magnitude. Since the assessed risk of smoking to smokers
themselves is many orders of magnitude larger than the risk
threshold for California Proposition 65, we run the danger of
creating a situation of excessive alarm. One product that vio-
lated the risk guidelines and was subject to the warning re-
quirements was Liquid Paper. This product was able to avoid
warning because of manufacturer reformulation. If the manu-
facturer had not done so, consumers would have in effect re-
ceived a warning for Liquid Paper that indicated a risk compa-
rable to that of cigarettes. Such warnings create a danger that
may induce undue complacency with respect to the risk of
smoking if consumers rightfully believe that Liquid Paper did
not in fact pose a major risk to their lives.
5. THE POTENTIAL EFFICACY OF HAZARD WARNINGS
Notwithstanding the difficulties individuals often have in
processing risk information, hazard warnings can be a poten-
tially effective tool in altering individual perceptions and influ-
encing risk-taking decisions. This section will assess hazard
warnings from the perspective of a hazard communication
system. Rather than examining whether warnings per se are
adequate, this section will focus on whether all information
that the representative consumer receives is sufficient to en-
able the consumer to make reliable risk judgements. 7
A substantial amount of literature has documented that
warnings are not particularly effective when their approach is
simply to browbeat consumers into changing their ways.48
Warnings that serve as reminders to consumers, such as the
urging to buckle seat belts, generally were not effective in
influencing behavior.4" Indeed, this lack of efficacy of warn-
47. This information will include prior knowledge about the product,
past experience in using the product, and information from a variety of
sources, possibly including warnings but also other sources of information,
such as the instructions provided with the product or special training
programs.
48. See Robert S. Adler & R. David Pittle, Cajolery or Command: Are
Education Campaigns an Adequate Substitute for Regulation? 2 YALE J.
ON REG. 159 (1984) (discussing the limitations of information and educa-
tion campaigns to change consumer behavior).
49. The ineffectiveness of warnings is demonstrated in the National
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ings has been so great that many observers have concluded
that warnings are simply not an effective means for influenc-
ing consumer behavior." This conclusion has proven to be
shortsighted, as it has been based on inferences derived from
situations in which warnings were not designed in a manner
that would enable them to have a constructive role. The key
criterion for judging the efficacy of a warning is the extent to
which it provides new information in a convincing manner.5'
This hypothesis with respect to warnings was explicitly tested
using data for four different workplace chemicals. Table 752
provides information regarding worker responses to four differ-
ent chemical labels. The impact of warnings in influencing
behavior can be assessed by comparing the differing worker
responses to the information presented.
Table 7 consists of four columns of data regarding the four
different labeling groups. Workers received different hazard
warnings for each of the four different chemicals: sodium bicar-
bonate, chloroacetophenone (an industrial chemical that causes
tearing), asbestos, and TNT.53 Participants in the survey were
Highway Traffic Safety Administration's ("NHTSA") comprehensive three-
year education campaign to increase safety belt use. Id. at 171. NHTSA's
warning campaign encompassed mass media, education incentive, and
private mandatory use programs. Id. Yet, at the two-year evaluation of
NHTSA's campaign, the agency found that the national seat belt usage
increased from 11.3 to 13.9%. Id. at 176. The result fell short of
NHTSA's goal of 25% safety belt use. Id. at 177.
50. ICL
51. See W. Kip Viscusi & Charles J. O'Connor, Adaptive Responses to
Chemical Labeling: Are Workers Bayesian Decision Makers?, 75 AM.
ECON. REV. 942, 948-56 (1984).
52. See VisCUSi & MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 7, at
113.
53. The following represents excerpts of each hazard label:
SODIUM BICARBONATE SPILL: Sweep-up, place in an appro-
priate chemical waste container.
CHLOROACETOPHENONE. WARNING! LACHRYMA-
TOR-VAPOR AND DUST EXTREMELY IRRITATING. Don't
breathe dust or vapor. Wear a self-contained breathing appara-
tus.
ASBESTOS. DANGER! CANCER HAZARD. Use with a NIOSH-
Mesa approved respirator. Use with approved goggles.
TNT-(blend of dry Trinitrotoluene). DANGER! HIGH EXPLO-
SIVES. MUST BE STORED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FEDERAL
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told that the chemical indicated in the warning would replace
the chemicals with which they now worked as part of their job.
TABLE SEVEN: MEANS OF VARIABLES
FOR EACH LABELING GROUP
RISK SODIUM CHLORACETO-
VARIABLE BICARBONATE PHENOME ASBESTOS TNT
(n=31) (n=106) (n=102) (n--96)
Risk before .12 .10 .09 .10
the warning
Risk after .06 .18 .26 .31
the warning
Risk
premium 0 1,919.01 2,995.59 5,158.31
($1982) _______ _______ ______
The first two rows in Table 7 indicate the shift in risk pref-
erences after receiving the new chemical. Row one indicates
the risk beliefs before seeing the chemical label, and row two
indicates the risk assessment after seeing the hazard warning
label. The metric used for these assessments is the equivalent
annual probability of injury that the worker views as being
tantamount to the risk posed by the job. In the case of sodium
bicarbonate, workers initially assessed the risk as being an
average annual frequency of 0.12, which they then lowered to
0.06 after learning that their current workplace chemicals
would be replaced by baking soda." The subsequent three col-
umns of chemical labels all begin with workers whose risk per-
ceptions are in the vicinity of 0.10. After being shown the
warning for the hazardous chemical, workers raised these risk
beliefs considerably. The greatest reactions to the information
REGULATIONS. KEEP IN COOL, DRY, WELL VENTILATED,
LOCK-UP AREA.
Viscusi & O'Connor, supra note 51, at 948. The sodium bicarbonate sam-
ple can be viewed as a control group because household baking soda is
essentially risk-free.
54. It is noteworthy that 0.06 is the accident frequency rate for the
chemical industry in the survey year.
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were for asbestos and TNT, for which the risk beliefs were
roughly tripled by the provision of the risk information.
The third row in Table 7 provides information regarding the
risk premium that workers would require to work with the
new chemical that was shown in the warning label.5" Al-
though workers did not require additional compensation to
work with the safe chemical, sodium bicarbonate, their annual
risk premium in 1982 dollars for the other three chemicals
ranged from almost $2,000 to over $5,000 in the case of TNT.
Moreover, these risk premiums per unit risk are comparable to
what is observed for workers currently in the U.S. workforce
who face actual risks of job injury." This job risk study in-
volving a sample of over 300 workers in the chemical industry
leads to the conclusion that hazard warnings can influence risk
beliefs and in turn attitudes toward accepting a job. Indeed,
many workers in the sample indicated that they would quit
their job if they were not compensated to face the added risk
(73% for TNT) and that they would be unwilling to take the job
again under these conditions. This survey focused on the risk
perception aspect, and it also revealed whether workers would
make the discrete choice of engaging in the risky activity as
opposed to taking specific precautions.
Similarly, hazard warnings can affect the consumption of a
risky product so that the discrete risky activity participation
choice in product contexts is also amenable to the influence of
warnings. Figure 2" indicates the U.S. total per capita ciga-
rette consumption over the 1900-1990 period. The three differ-
ent eras of hazard warnings appear in the graph. As is evident
from this trend, per capita cigarette consumption was on the
rise through the mid-1950s. At that point, substantial public
55. A large body of economic theory suggests that workers will require
a compensating wage differential to work on a job that poses added risk.
This doctrine, which has been in place since the time of Adam Smith, is
borne out quite strongly in these results. Viscusi & O'Connor, supra note
51, at 945.
56. In particular, the implicit value of injuries as estimated using an
earnings equation is shown to be comparable for the hazard warning
group to the estimates obtained before the warnings were in place. Id. at
942-56.
57. See Viscusi, SMOKING, supra note 40, at 54.
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dissemination of adverse information with respect to smoking
increased, which culminated in the 1964 release of the U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare report on the
lung cancer risks of smoking." In part because of this infor-
mation as well as subsequent warnings, there has been a dra-
matic shift in the public's perception of smoking risks and a
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58. See VISCUSI, SMOKING, supra note 40, at 62-83.
59. Id. at 55-59.
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The relationship between risk perceptions and smoking
behavior is not conjecture. Using data on a large sample of
smokers and nonsmokers, it was demonstrated that an in-
crease in lung cancer risk perceptions had a substantial nega-
tive effect on an individual's propensity to smoke.6" For exam-
ple, if individuals believed the lung cancer risk from smoking
had a probability of 0.05 rather than their current assessment
of 0.42, then societal smoking rates would rise by 8%."1 Thus
there is a direct linkage between risk beliefs and the likelihood
that an individual will choose to smoke. Hazard warnings can
play a constructive role in that context to the extent that they
can influence the risks that people assess with respect to
smoking activity.
A similar result occurred in the case of saccharin warnings,
which were introduced in 1978. Studies have shown that the
introduction of these warnings had a substantial depressing
effect on the sales of products containing saccharin.62 One
study, for example, found that diet soft drink sales grew at a
faster rate before warnings were introduced then they did after
the saccharin warnings went into effect.6" In particular, the
study suggested that the average annual growth rate in diet
soft drink sales from 1975 to 1977 was 17.2%, and this rate de-
clined to 1.8% by 1978.64 A subsequent study concluded that
the introduction of the saccharin warning label reduced the
sales of diet soft drinks by 4% and media coverage of the risks
of saccharin reduced sales by 17%."6 Disentangling these in-
fluences is necessarily difficult since the introduction of a haz-
ard warning through public policy in all likelihood would affect
60. Id. at 99-100.
61. See id. at 100.
62. See Robert G. Orwin et al., Evaluating the Life Cycle of a Product
Warning: Saccharin and Diet Soft Drinks, 8 EVALUATION REV. 801 (1984)
(documenting effects of saccharin warning labels on sale of diet soft
drinks); Raymond E. Schucker et al., The Impact of the Saccharin Warn-
ing Label on Sales of Diet Soft Drinks in Supermarkets, 2 J. PUB. POL.
& MKTG. 46 (1983) (summarizing the sales trends of diet and regular
soft drinks).
63. Schucker, supra note 62, at 47.
64. Id.
65. Orwin, supra note 62, at 815.
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the extent of media coverage given to the risk as well.6
Another example of the efficacy of warnings is the example
of tetracycline. This prescription drug, which is still a recom-
mended treatment for ailments such as lyme disease and
Rocky Mountain spotted fever, has the adverse effect among
children ages zero to eight of causing tooth staining. In partic-
ular, the drug affected the coloration of permanent teeth in
children, thus causing a visual discoloration in their adult
teeth. In 1963, pharmaceutical companies introduced a hazard
warning for this tooth staining risk to alert physicians to the
potential hazard. 7
Figure 368 presents the number of initial and renewed phy-
sician prescriptions of tetracycline (i.e., mentions per 1,000
population) as a function of the year. The age zero-eight pat-
tern indicates the tetracycline usage for the at risk group, and
the age nine plus pattern indicates the tetracycline usage for
the group that was not susceptible to the tooth staining risk. If
the tooth staining warning had not been given, then one would
expect the usage of tetracycline for the age zero-eight group to
follow the same shape of the trajectory for the age nine plus
group. Thus the age nine plus group curve shape serves as a
reference point for how the drug should perform given the
availability of other drugs on the market, as well as possible
decreased efficacy of the drug. As can be seen, even for the age
nine plus group, eventually the drug use did taper off around
1972. In the case of the at risk group, however, beginning in
1963 there was a sharp and steady decline in tetracycline
usage. This dramatic shift certainly suggests that the hazard
warning that was included in the patient package insert and is
published in the Physician's Desk Reference69 did in fact in-
66. I at 810.
67. The shift in hazard warnings can be ascertained by reviewing
annual versions of THE PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE. See also W. KIP
VIscusI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 152 (1991) [hereinafter VIscusI,
REFORMING] (discussing the April 1963 introduction of warnings).
68. See ViSCusi, REFORMING, supra note 67, at 153.
69. The warning suggested in The Physician's Desk Reference read:
THE USE OF DRUGS OF THE TETRACYCLINE CLASS DUR-
ING TOOTH DEVELOPMENT (LAST HALF OF PREGNANCY,
INFANCY AND CHILDHOOD TO THE AGE OF 8 YEARS) MAY
CAUSE PERMANENT DISCOLORATION OF THE TEETH (YEL-
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Figure 7.1. Use of Letracycline. 1960-1975. as measured by mentions (prescriptions and renewals)
FIGURE 3
It is also the case that not all doctors ceased prescribing
tetracycline after the hazard warning. This result is not unex-
pected because tetracycline continues to be an effective treat-
ment mode. Moreover, despite the risk of tooth staining, there
may be other competing risks, such as threats to a patient's
life. In addition, it may take time before doctors can develop
and learn about alternative effective therapies and for new
substitute drugs to become available on the market. Thus the
response to hazard warning information is not always immedi-
ate as there may be some time lag before people can fully
LOW-GRAY-BROWN).... TETRACYCLINE DRUGS, THERE-
FORE, SHOULD NOT BE USED IN THIS AGE GROUP UN-
LESS OTHER DRUGS ARE NOT LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE
OR ARE CONTRAINDICATED.
THE PHYSIcIAN's DESK REFERENCE 1367 (50th ed. 1996).
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adapt to the implications of this information. This lag does not
imply that hazard warnings are ineffective, however, only that
they are operating in a context in which other aspects of deci-
sions, other than the warnings and the risk of the product
itself, influence the actions of the public.7 ° Indeed, in this in-
stance since the decision maker was a learned intermediary,
the physician, one would certainly expect a reasonably prompt
response to the hazard warning information given the
physician's extensive training in pharmacology.
Hazard warnings also affect the precautions consumers take
with respect to products. Lawn mower warnings urge consum-
ers not to put their hands or feet under the mower, and warn-
ings for many prescription drugs alert consumers to the dan-
gers of mixing the drugs with alcohol. Experimental evidence
suggests that these types of warnings are potentially effective
in alerting consumers to the presence of the risk and the need
to take precautions.71
To assess the effect of hazard warning labels on precaution-
ary behavior, consider the results for alternative labels for
household bleach. Bleach is a particularly prominent hazard in
that it accounts for a large share of adult poisonings. 2
Table 871 presents alternative frequencies with which con-
sumers would take different precautions. The columns in Table
8 report the percentage of the sample who would follow the
desired precaution. The groups were stratified into different
populations that were given alternative warning labels.74 The
70. See generally Barbara M. McGarey, Comment, Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers and Consumer-Directed Information Enhancing the Safety
of Prescription Drug Use, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 153 (1984) (advocating
multi-source communication system to improve consumer access to pre-
scription drug information).
71. See generally MAGAT & ViSCUSI, INFORMATIONAL APPROACHES,
supra note 7, at 64.
72. A major risk of bleach is that if bleach is mixed with ammonia or
ammonia-based products, chloramine gas will form.
73. See VISCUSI & MAGAT, LEARNING ABOUT RISK, supra note 7, at 66.
74. It should be emphasized that the fact that consumers observed a
particular precaution, such as refraining from adding the product to am-
monia based cleaners, does not necessarily indicate that they are exercis-
ing a concern for safety. Rather, they may not have simply considered
this action for other reasons as well.
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first column of statistics gives the results for the product for
which no warning regarding the risks was provided. By com-
paring the results in this column with the columns for other
warnings, it is possible to assess the incremental effect of the
hazard warnings. The study first tested the label on Chlorox,
which was the dominant national brand of bleach. The warn-
ings on this product were sufficient to alert an additional 7% of
consumers not to mix the product with toilet bowl cleaner and
to lead an additional 20% to store the product in a childproof
location. The next column gives the results for the Bright
brand of bleach, the house brand for the Kroger food store
chain. This warning label was particularly effective in alerting
consumers not to mix bleach with toilet bowl cleaner, but it
was less successful than the Chlorox label in leading consum-
ers to store the product in a childproof location. The test label,
which was restructured and reformatted to assist consumers in
the processing of the information, had the strongest response
to the precautions. The maximum incremental effect of warn-
ing labels appears in the final column of Table 8.
TABLE EIGHT: EFFECTS OF LABELS ON PRECAUTION-
TAKING: BLEACH (PERCENTAGES)
NO MAXIMUM
PRECAUTION WARNING CLOROX BRIGHT TEST INCREMENTAL
(n--51) (n--59) (n=42) (n--44) EFFECT
1. Do not mix with
toilet bowl cleaner 16 23 36 40 24
(if toilet is badly
stained)
2. Do not add to am-
monia-based clean- 69 68 69 84 16
ers (for particularly
dirty jobs)
3. Store in childproof 43 63 50 76 33
location
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TABLE NINE: EFFECT OF WARNINGS ON PRECAUTIONS





DEVIL LYE TEST NO EFFECT (96)
LABEL LABEL WARNING




children under five 90 83 70 20
Households with
no children under 63 61 48 15
five
Similar results appear in Table 9"5 for precautions with re-
spect to drain openers. The specific product tested was a hy-
brid of Drano and Red Devil Lye. This label was considerably
more effective than the test label or a label purged of warning
information. Overall, the label was sufficient to lead 82% of re-
spondents to want to wear rubber gloves when using the prod-
uct and 90% of households with children under the age of five
to store the product in a childproof location. These warning
labels consequently had a strong effect on precautions. Never-
theless, presumably because of the consumers' intrinsic knowl-
edge of the riskiness of this class of products - perhaps due in
part to having received warning labels in the past - the level
of precautions was already high even in the absence of specific
warning information.
The failure of some consumers to take precautions does not
necessarily indicate the ineffectiveness of hazard warnings.
Considering the probabilities of the adverse events occurring
and reasonable preferences regarding this risk, it might be
quite reasonable for some people to choose not to wear rubber
gloves because of the discomfort involved. 6 If it is desirable to
75. See Viscusi, REFORMING, supra note 67, at 138.
76. The survey also listed information regarding the disutility of, for
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compel such behavior rather than rely on decentralized deci-
sion making that is assisted with the aid of information, then
the government should consider other regulatory strategies. In
the case of very potent pesticides, for example, the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency requires that one become a certi-
fied pesticide applicator before using these pesticides."
Due to cognitive limitations, the information format and
structure are consequential, not simply the content. The impor-
tance of information structure is reflected in the previous re-
sults for bleach and drain opener. In each instance, with the
exception of the no warning situation, the products contained
the same risk information though it was structured and pre-
sented differently. The salience of the information and the
manner in which it is presented do influence, at least to a
degree, the ability of consumers to process the information.
Important dangers associated with hazard warnings are
information overload and label clutter. If warnings are overly
detailed, consumers will not be able to reliably process the
information, thus impeding their ability to make informed deci-
sions. The potential influence of label clutter is reflected in the
three warning labels that appear in Figures 4a, 4b, and 4c.
The baseline product in 4a is modeled after Ortho Malathion, a
nationally marketed insect spray. The warning shown is in
black and white, but the test warning used in the experimental
study was in color.7" Figure 4a is the reference point label
that reflects label clutter. By deleting some of the risk infor-
mation and increasing the print size for some of the warning
information, Figure 4b facilitates consumer's ability to process
the information. The final warning label shown in Figure 4c
makes the warning information even bolder than before; the
warnings box consumes an entire column of warning informa-
tion.
example, wearing rubber gloves.
77. See 7 U.S.C. § 136(a)(1) (1994) (requiring federal certification of
state licensing programs issuing licenses to obtain restricted use pesti-
cides).
78. For a description of the experimental results and documentation of
many of the statements made here, see MAGAT & Viscusi, INFORMATION-
AL APPROACHES, supra note 7, at 27-43.
1996] 661
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 661 1995-1996




~. * . * ..
............ '.
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 662 1995-1996
1996] HAZARD WARNINGS 663
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 663 1995-1996
664 RUTGERS LAW REVIEW [Vol.48:625
= i .. ..
M
WIN l I "Il Ill
6 1 IS. .
.... fi l ie4"! I
i [!!lllJ I' ,,ff . I .i2
HeinOnline  -- 48 Rutgers L. Rev. 664 1995-1996
HAZARD WARNINGS
The studies on this product, as well as a similar study on
toilet bowl cleaner, led to several conclusions. Label clutter is
an impediment to consumers' ability to process the warning
information. When inundated with a variety of hazard warn-
ings such as on the cluttered label in Figure 4a, consumers
generally grasp the notion that the product is risky, but are
less able to distinguish the degree of risks and precautions
needed because of the extensive information they have been
provided. Improving the clarity of the risk information and
pruning the label of some of the extraneous information, as
demonstrated in Figure 4b, is a desirable modification that
assists consumers in information processing. Such improve-
ments, however, do have a diminishing effect on consumers'
ability to process warning information. The enlarged type used
in Figure 4c, as well as similar manipulations for other prod-
ucts, do not confer a significant incremental benefit. Thus, the
major task of warning labels is to restrict the information to a
reasonable degree and to present it in a clear and easily pro-
cessed manner. Once this level of clarity has been achieved,
additional nuances such as bolder boxing, larger print size, and
similar manipulations do not have consequential influence on
the efficacy of the warning. Consumers generally face a situa-
tion of information overload. Product warning labels are prolif-
erating, and, as was reflected in the insecticide label, the ver-
biage on the warnings is increasing as well. What are the
incentives that have led to this situation?
First, from the standpoint of label proliferation, the difficulty
is that no individual producer has the incentive to think about
how the addition of one warning label will dilute the efficacy of
other warnings by adding to the number of warnings that
consumers must process. The more products that include such
warnings, the more warnings are diluted for other products.
Similarly, regulatory and liability pressures lead firms to make
their warnings as comprehensive as possible. The result is that
there is a potential danger of information overload from the
increase in the amount of information and the diversity of
risks included in the warning.
Excessive warnings are not innocuous. If warnings indicate
a high relative risk when there is none, they will distort rela-
tive product comparisons, thus compromising credibility. Simi-
larly, if warnings are included for inconsequential risks, they
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will serve to further dilute the warnings for the real hazards
that should be identified to consumers.
The problems associated with information formatting can be
alleviated to some extent through the use of a common format
and structure. One possibility is to adopt a uniform hazard
warnings vocabulary.79 Of the Federal warnings efforts, the
Food and Drug Administration warnings for prescription drugs
is perhaps the best model. That warning system includes a
common format for all warnings for directions, contraindica-
tions, and other information. The information appears in a
consistent manner across all warning labels. Moreover, be-
cause all warnings are drafted in large part by the Food and
Drug Administration and in all cases are specifically approved
by them, the agency can ensure that there is a consistent
warnings vocabulary across hazard warning labels. Conse-
quently, the use of bold type or of the boxing of warnings and
similar nuances can be undertaken in a manner that truly
reflects the relative risk.
The introduction of a hazard warnings vocabulary as a refer-
ence point could serve to alleviate many of the problems associ-
ated with warnings. At the present time, companies have no
safe harbor with respect to warnings. Because there is no regu-
latory compliance defense and no generally accepted hazard
warnings vocabulary, companies may have the incentive to
overwarn in order to avert potential liability costs. This incen-
tive for overwarning is augmented by the asymmetry in the
court created penalties; companies are penalized for
underwarning but not for overwarning. The establishment of a
uniform vocabulary coupled with a regulatory compliance de-
fense for warnings that adhere to this vocabulary would ensure
that firms could warn consistently across product lines and
that the warning language that was selected would have a
consistent meaning to the consumers who process the informa-
tion.
79. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
PERSONAL INJURY (1991); VISCUSI, REFORMING, supra note 67, at 155-56
(proposing a national warnings policy for a national vocabulary for warn-
ings to bolster the regulatory compliance defense).
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6. IMPLICATIONS OF FAILURES FOR WARNING DESIGN
Hazard warnings policy should reflect the role of cognitive
limitations in consumer processing of warning information. In
particular, consumers should not be overloaded with extrane-
ous information; the necessary information should be format-
ted in a manner that can be readily processed. In addition,
hazard warnings should provide new information in a clear
and consistent manner without attempting to simply persuade
consumers into changing their views or preferences.
Even with an effective warnings policy, 100% effectiveness is
unlikely to alter behavior in the desired manner. For some per-
centage of the consumers, the desired action will simply not be
rational, as in the case of consumers who choose not to wear
rubber gloves while using a caustic drain opener. Another
group of consumers will not receive the warning message, and
for others the warning message will not alter their actions
because they do not process the message reliably.
How then should we assess the desirability of warnings as
compared with other more direct interventions, such as either
government regulation or tort liability? The approach here will
be to adopt an appropriately specified risk-utility analysis, in
effect a benefit-cost test.80 The benefit of hazard warnings is
to improve consumer decisions, fostering appropriate precau-
tions and minimizing risk taking activities. The costs associat-
ed with warnings include not only the direct informational
costs, but also the costs associated with needless precautions
and excessive warnings that lead consumers to avoid non-risky
behaviors. A similar analysis could be applied for the desirabil-
ity of additional safety devices.
The critical issue is not so much how one thinks about the
test, but rather the reference point used. Should we, for exam-
ple, focus on the worst case scenario - the consumers who will
either not receive the warning message or will not act in a
sensible manner? If that is our reference point, then very
strong interventionist measures will be desirable.
The reference point used here will be somewhat different.
80. I have elaborated on this test earlier in Viscusi, REFORMING,
supra note 67. Essentially, it avoids the overlaps of Wade's risk utility
test and eliminates the insurance objective. See Wade, infra note 82.
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The audience for mass produced consumer products is not a
single flawed individual but rather the entire marketplace,
including both consumers who do and do not behave rationally.
Given this mix of individuals, what policy, either in terms of
hazard warnings or safety devices, will produce the greatest
net benefit to society? More specifically, how can we maximize
the difference between the benefits and the costs associated
with these actions? In general, while there will be some per-
centage of failures in the population, we cannot target our
interventions to those specific people. Instead, we should ask
whether the warnings pass muster for the entire market and,
if so, then warnings should remain the desired policy approach
even though direct control of the product risk characteristics
might protect the small segment of consumers who do not
make sound decisions.
The decision to switch to a regime in which the product risk
characteristics are directly controlled should not be a casual
one. Warnings take advantage of the heterogeneity of individu-
al responses to risk and enable people to make choices consis-
tent with their own preferences. Once we move to a situation
in which uniform safety characteristics are instituted across
the entire market, this heterogeneity is no longer expressed.
Thus one must assess whether the benefits from avoiding mis-
taken decisions achieved through mandating safety character-
istics are sufficient to offset the welfare loss incurred both
through the additional cost of providing the safety as well as
by the elimination of choices in the marketplace. Once again,
the most desirable policy depends on which yields the greatest
net benefit to society.
Although undertaking risk-utility tests of various kinds may
cause serious implementation problems for the courts, using
them for general analysis should pose less difficulty, especially
when it is unnecessary to actually explore these issues in de-
tail. For instance, in situations where companies have com-
plied with explicit government safety regulations that ensure
that an efficient level of safety has been provided (i.e., a level
of safety such that if higher safety levels were required the
costs of doing so would exceed the benefits), those firms should
be given credit for fulfilling their safety obligations. A promi-
nent example offering a rationale for a strong regulatory com-
pliance defense would be the FDA's requirement for prescrip-
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tion drugs. In addition to basically dictating the warning lan-
guage, the FDA's very elaborate premarket approval program
ensures the safety and efficacy of these products to the highest
level possible based on the information available. Unless there
is evidence of fraud or withholding of information from the
regulatory agency, courts have little rationale for second guess-
ing these regulatory decisions.81
7. THE IRRELEVANCE OF INSURANCE MARKET FAILURES
The standard rationale explaining both the need for strict
liability and the failure of hazard warnings is that insurance
markets do not function adequately. Insurance has long played
a central role behind the strict liability regime and has there-
fore been incorporated into the risk-utility test specified by
Dean Wade.82 Although this insurance rationale is feasible in
cases of isolated manufacturing defects, it makes little sense in
the world of modern tort liability.
This insurance rationale assumes producers can spread the
costs of insurance across product lines, thereby reducing the
average cost to any particular product. With the advent of
design defect and hazard warnings cases which affect an entire
product line, it is no longer feasible to spread the costs among
a large group because instead of having independent and iden-
tically distributed risks for each product, the risks are correlat-
ed across the products. Accordingly, firms are hit with waves of
liability rather than isolated events that are well suited for
insurance coverage.
An additional difficulty arises with respect to retroactive
liability. Consumers will pay for insurance associated with
products only if this insurance is purchased on a prospective
basis.' In the situation of retroactive liability, firms will not
81. For a fuller advocacy of the regulatory compliance defence, see W.
Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Eco-
nomic Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1437, 1463-67 (1994).
82. J. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44
MIss. L.J. 825, 837-38 (1973).
83. It should also be noted that this insurance must be valued by con-
sumers. If consumers already have purchased private insurance coverage,
then additional insurance that duplicates this coverage will be less desir-
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be able to pass on these costs to future generations of purchas-
ers of the product, because while consumers may be willing to
pay for present or future product costs, they may be unwilling
to pay for benefits already received by others. Firms attempt-
ing to recoup these historic liability costs will be undercut by
new entrants to the market who, with lower costs, have corre-
spondingly lower prices.
This basic difficulty creates a problem for unanticipated
risks, such as changes in tort liability. In such situations, pro-
ducers are not in a position to incorporate an insurance con-
tract into the bundle of product characteristics.
Mass toxic torts, such as those associated with inadequate
asbestos warnings, also do not fit the insurance regime. The
costs associated with asbestos suits exceeded both insurance
and manufacturer resources.84 Part of the problem stemmed
from insurance companies who consistently underestimated
the loss, therefore undercharging premiums. Lloyds of London,
the famed insurer that covers risks ranging from pianists
hands to basketball player Grant Hill, estimated that there
would be 80,000 asbestos claims in 1980, but by 1990 raised
this estimate to 180,000 claims.85 Breast implants, the Dalkon
Shield, and DES are similar in character. Large scale losses
could not be handled by producers in the same manner as
hypothesized for isolated manufacturing defects. Consequently,
when formulating the risk-utility test - or some variate of it -
to judge either hazard warnings or changes in product charac-
teristics, both the legitimate insurance difficulties and the
often infeasible insurance objective of tort liability must be
recognized.
able.
84. See, e.g., Barnaby J. Feder, Asbestos: The Saga Drags On, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 1989, at C1 (discussing companies driven into bankruptcy
as a result of asbestos litigation).
85. See Nick Sinfield, Asbestos - Human or Natural Disaster?, Address
Before the Stanford University Conference on Social Treatment of Cata-
strophic Risk (1994).
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8. CRITERIA FOR LIABILITY REFORM
The presumption of a totally irrational consumer is simply
not warranted, despite the existence of cognitive limitations.
For example, people can seldom process more than five to sev-
en pieces of information. Notwithstanding the influence of
these cognitive limitations, it is not correct to draw the sim-
plistic conclusion that risks are always underestimated. Risk
perceptions are not always accurate, but underestimation is
not the norm. Indeed, for very small risks, there is a consistent
pattern of overestimation of the hazards.8
The introduction of a uniform hazard warnings vocabulary
would also assist in the design of consistent warnings across
products, facilitate information processing and provide courts
with a standardized test of warning sufficiency. At present,
companies may have an excessive incentive for overwarning
because tort liability penalizes firms for underwarning but not
for overwarning. Coupling this tort uncertainty with the ab-
sence of a safe harbor may lead to excessive hazard warnings.
A market based analysis should be used before a move from
hazard warnings to a more stringent form of intervention, such
as direct control of product risk characteristics. While there
will always be some percentage of consumers who either do not
receive or do not act sensibly upon the message, the existence
of some failures does not indicate a worst case scenario. In
addition, a market based perspective should reflect the scope of
decisions made by the firm. Ultimately, the question becomes
whether warnings make sense for the broad range of preferenc-
es reflected in the market, or whether standardization of the
safety level is preferable. These issues can be resolved through
properly formulated risk-utility tests, uncontaminated by the
unspecified insurance objectives of tort liability. The current
system is infeasible and is based upon a misunderstanding of
how insurance markets work.
86. See W. Kip Viscusi & O'Connor, supra note 51, at 59 (1985) (not-
ing that a "widely cited result in the risk perception literature is that
individuals assessing risks of fatality overassess the risks of low proba-
bility events (e.g., smallpox and botulism) and underassess the risks of
high probability events (e.g., diabetes and stroke)").
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